joshua/dash-docs
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/seigler/dash-docs synced 2025-07-27 09:46:12 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

Mention Side-Channel Attacks In Addition To Lack-Of-Entropy Attacks

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
David A. Harding 2014-05-11 13:46:03 -04:00
parent cc2105debc
commit 1885c15ba3
1 changed files with 5 additions and 4 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

9
_includes/guide_transactions.md
View file

@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ described below, with more general attacks hypothesized).
1. Unique (non-reused) P2PH and P2SH addresses protect against the first
type of attack by keeping ECDSA public keys hidden (hashed) until the
first time satoshis stored in those addresses are spent, so attacks
first time satoshis sent to those addresses are spent, so attacks
are effectively useless unless they can reconstruct private keys in
less than the hour or two it takes for a transaction to be well
protected by the block chain.
@ -610,9 +610,10 @@ described below, with more general attacks hypothesized).
2. Unique (non-reused) private keys protect against the second type of
attack by only generating one signature per private key, so attackers
never get a subsequent signature to use in comparison-based attacks.
Existing comparison-based attacks are only practical today when there
is an error in the ECDSA implementation or a lack of entropy in one
of the values used for signing.
Existing comparison-based attacks are only practical today when
insufficient entropy is used in signing or when the entropy used
is exposed by some means, such as a
[side-channel attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack).
So, for both privacy and security, we encourage you to build your
applications to avoid public key reuse and, when possible, to discourage