Guide - update contracts section

_includes/devdoc/guide_contracts.md

@@ -9,14 +9,13 @@ http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
 
 {% autocrossref %}
 
-Contracts are
-transactions which use the decentralized Bitcoin system to enforce financial
-agreements.
-Bitcoin contracts can often be crafted to minimize dependency on outside
+Contracts are transactions which use the decentralized Dash system to enforce
+financial agreements.
+Dash contracts can often be crafted to minimize dependency on outside
 agents, such as the court system, which significantly decreases the risk
-of dealing with unknown entities in financial transactions. 
+of dealing with unknown entities in financial transactions.
 
-The following subsections will describe a variety of Bitcoin contracts
+The following subsections will describe a variety of Dash contracts
 already in use. Because contracts deal with real people, not just
 transactions, they are framed below in story format.
 
@@ -35,18 +34,18 @@ Charlie-the-customer wants to buy a product from Bob-the-businessman,
 but neither of them trusts the other person, so they use a contract to
 help ensure Charlie gets his merchandise and Bob gets his payment.
 
-A simple contract could say that Charlie will spend satoshis to an
+A simple contract could say that Charlie will spend duffs to an
 output which can only be spent if Charlie and Bob both sign the input
 spending it. That means Bob won't get paid unless Charlie gets his
 merchandise, but Charlie can't get the merchandise and keep his payment.
 
 This simple contract isn't much help if there's a dispute, so Bob and
 Charlie enlist the help of Alice-the-arbitrator to create an [escrow
-contract][/en/glossary/escrow-contract]{:#term-escrow-contract}{:.term}. Charlie spends his satoshis
+contract][/en/glossary/escrow-contract]{:#term-escrow-contract}{:.term}. Charlie spends his duffs
 to an output which can only be spent if two of the three people sign the
 input. Now Charlie can pay Bob if everything is ok, Bob can refund
 Charlie's money if there's a problem, or Alice can arbitrate and decide
-who should get the satoshis if there's a dispute.
+who should get the duffs if there's a dispute.
 
 To create a multiple-signature ([multisig][/en/glossary/multisig]{:#term-multisig}{:.term})
 output, they each give the others a public key. Then Bob creates the
@@ -72,18 +71,18 @@ keys provided).
 
 Bob gives the redeem script to Charlie, who checks to make sure his
 public key and Alice's public key are included. Then he hashes the
-redeem script to create a P2SH redeem script and pays the satoshis to it. Bob
+redeem script to create a P2SH redeem script and pays the duffs to it. Bob
 sees the payment get added to the block chain and ships the merchandise.
 
 Unfortunately, the merchandise gets slightly damaged in transit. Charlie
 wants a full refund, but Bob thinks a 10% refund is sufficient. They
 turn to Alice to resolve the issue. Alice asks for photo evidence from
 Charlie along with a copy of the redeem script Bob created and
-Charlie checked. 
+Charlie checked.
 
 After looking at the evidence, Alice thinks a 40% refund is sufficient,
 so she creates and signs a transaction with two outputs, one that spends 60%
-of the satoshis to Bob's public key and one that spends the remaining
+of the duffs to Bob's public key and one that spends the remaining
 40% to Charlie's public key.
 
 In the signature script Alice puts her signature
@@ -116,14 +115,16 @@ validates, the two transaction outputs show up in Bob's and Charlie's
 wallets as spendable balances.
 
 However, if Alice created and signed a transaction neither of them would
-agree to, such as spending all the satoshis to herself, Bob and Charlie
-can find a new arbitrator and sign a transaction spending the satoshis
+agree to, such as spending all the duffs to herself, Bob and Charlie
+can find a new arbitrator and sign a transaction spending the duffs
 to another 2-of-3 multisig redeem script hash, this one including a public
 key from that second arbitrator. This means that Bob and Charlie never
 need to worry about their arbitrator stealing their money.
 
+<!--
 **Resource:** [BitRated](https://www.bitrated.com/) provides a multisig arbitration
 service interface using HTML/JavaScript on a GNU AGPL-licensed website.
+-->
 
 {% endautocrossref %}
 
@@ -133,25 +134,25 @@ service interface using HTML/JavaScript on a GNU AGPL-licensed website.
 {% autocrossref %}
 
 <!-- SOMEDAY: try to rewrite using a more likely real-world example without
-making the text or illustration more complicated --> 
+making the text or illustration more complicated -->
 
 Alice also works part-time moderating forum posts for Bob. Every time
 someone posts to Bob's busy forum, Alice skims the post to make sure it
 isn't offensive or spam. Alas, Bob often forgets to pay her, so Alice
 demands to be paid immediately after each post she approves or rejects.
 Bob says he can't do that because hundreds of small payments will cost
-him thousands of satoshis in transaction fees, so Alice suggests they use a
+him thousands of duffs in transaction fees, so Alice suggests they use a
 [micropayment channel][]{:#term-micropayment-channel}{:.term}.
 
 Bob asks Alice for her public key and then creates two transactions.
-The first transaction pays 100 millibitcoins to a P2SH output whose
+The first transaction pays 100 millidash to a P2SH output whose
 2-of-2 multisig redeem script requires signatures from both Alice and Bob.
 This is the bond transaction.
-Broadcasting this transaction would let Alice hold the millibitcoins
+Broadcasting this transaction would let Alice hold the millidash
 hostage, so Bob keeps this transaction private for now and creates a
 second transaction.
 
-The second transaction spends all of the first transaction's millibitcoins
+The second transaction spends all of the first transaction's millidash
 (minus a transaction fee) back to Bob after a 24 hour delay enforced
 by locktime. This is the refund transaction. Bob can't sign the refund transaction by himself, so he gives
 it to Alice to sign, as shown in the
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ future, signs it, and gives a copy of it back to Bob. She then asks Bob
 for the bond transaction and checks that the refund transaction spends
 the output of the bond transaction. She can now broadcast the bond
 transaction to the network to ensure Bob has to wait for the time lock
-to expire before further spending his millibitcoins. Bob hasn't actually
+to expire before further spending his millidash. Bob hasn't actually
 spent anything so far, except possibly a small transaction fee, and
 he'll be able to broadcast the refund transaction in 24 hours for a
 full refund.
@@ -190,21 +191,22 @@ near the time lock expiry, she could be cheated out of her payment.
 Transaction malleability, discussed above in the Transactions section,
 is another reason to limit the value of micropayment channels.
 If someone uses transaction malleability to break the link between the
-two transactions, Alice could hold Bob's 100 millibitcoins hostage even if she
+two transactions, Alice could hold Bob's 100 millidash hostage even if she
 hadn't done any work.
 
-For larger payments, Bitcoin transaction fees are very low as a
+For larger payments, Dash transaction fees are very low as a
 percentage of the total transaction value, so it makes more sense to
 protect payments with immediately-broadcast separate transactions.
 
-**Resource:** The [bitcoinj][] Java library
+**Resource:** The [dashj][] Java library
 provides a complete set of micropayment functions, an example
 implementation, and [a
-tutorial][bitcoinj micropayment tutorial]
+tutorial (from bitcoinj)][bitcoinj micropayment tutorial]
 all under an Apache license.
 
 {% endautocrossref %}
 
+<!-- Obsolesced by PrivateSend
 ### CoinJoin
 {% include helpers/subhead-links.md %}
 
@@ -212,28 +214,28 @@ all under an Apache license.
 
 Alice is concerned about her privacy.  She knows every transaction gets
 added to the public block chain, so when Bob and Charlie pay her, they
-can each easily track those satoshis to learn what Bitcoin
+can each easily track those duffs to learn what Bitcoin
 addresses she pays, how much she pays them, and possibly how many
-satoshis she has left.
+duffs she has left.
 
 Alice isn't a criminal, she just wants plausible deniability about
-where she has spent her satoshis and how many she has left, so she
+where she has spent her duffs and how many she has left, so she
 starts up the Tor anonymity service on her computer and logs into an
 IRC chatroom as "AnonGirl."
 
 Also in the chatroom are "Nemo" and "Neminem."  They collectively
-agree to transfer satoshis between each other so no one besides them
-can reliably determine who controls which satoshis.  But they're faced
-with a dilemma: who transfers their satoshis to one of the other two
+agree to transfer duffs between each other so no one besides them
+can reliably determine who controls which duffs.  But they're faced
+with a dilemma: who transfers their duffs to one of the other two
 pseudonymous persons first? The CoinJoin-style contract, shown in the
 illustration below, makes this decision easy: they create a single
 transaction which does all of the spending simultaneously, ensuring none
-of them can steal the others' satoshis.
+of them can steal the others' duffs.
 
 ![Example CoinJoin Transaction](/img/dev/en-coinjoin.svg)
 
 Each contributor looks through their collection of Unspent Transaction
-Outputs (UTXOs) for 100 millibitcoins they can spend. They then each generate
+Outputs (UTXOs) for 100 millidash they can spend. They then each generate
 a brand new public key and give UTXO details and pubkey hashes to the
 facilitator.  In this case, the facilitator is AnonGirl; she creates
 a transaction spending each of the UTXOs to three equally-sized outputs.
@@ -243,7 +245,7 @@ AnonGirl then signs her inputs using `SIGHASH_ALL` to ensure nobody can
 change the input or output details.  She gives the partially-signed
 transaction to Nemo who signs his inputs the same way and passes it
 to Neminem, who also signs it the same way.  Neminem then broadcasts
-the transaction to the peer-to-peer network, mixing all of the millibitcoins in
+the transaction to the peer-to-peer network, mixing all of the millidash in
 a single transaction.
 
 As you can see in the illustration, there's no way for anyone besides
@@ -257,19 +259,19 @@ Neminem.  If Alice does a few more CoinJoins, Bob and Charlie might
 have to guess which transactions made by dozens or hundreds of people
 were actually made by Alice.
 
-The complete history of Alice's satoshis is still in the block chain,
+The complete history of Alice's duffs is still in the block chain,
 so a determined investigator could talk to the people AnonGirl
-CoinJoined with to find out the ultimate origin of her satoshis and
+CoinJoined with to find out the ultimate origin of her duffs and
 possibly reveal AnonGirl as Alice. But against anyone casually browsing
 block chain history, Alice gains plausible deniability.
 
 The CoinJoin technique described above costs the participants a small
-amount of satoshis to pay the transaction fee.  An alternative
-technique, purchaser CoinJoin, can actually save them satoshis and
+amount of duffs to pay the transaction fee.  An alternative
+technique, purchaser CoinJoin, can actually save them duffs and
 improve their privacy at the same time.
 
 AnonGirl waits in the IRC chatroom until she wants to make a purchase.
-She announces her intention to spend satoshis and waits until someone
+She announces her intention to spend duffs and waits until someone
 else wants to make a purchase, likely from a different merchant. Then
 they combine their inputs the same way as before but set the outputs
 to the separate merchant addresses so nobody will be able to figure
@@ -280,10 +282,11 @@ Since they would've had to pay a transaction fee to make their purchases
 anyway, AnonGirl and her co-spenders don't pay anything extra---but
 because they reduced overhead by combining multiple transactions, saving
 bytes, they may be able to pay a smaller aggregate transaction fee,
-saving each one of them a tiny amount of satoshis.
+saving each one of them a tiny amount of duffs.
+
 
 **Resource:** An alpha-quality (as of this writing) implementation of decentralized
 CoinJoin is [CoinMux](http://coinmux.com/), available under the Apache
 license.
-
+-->
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