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Bugfix: "merkle root" and "merkle tree" are common nouns, so generally lowercase

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Luke Dashjr 2014-10-02 01:19:05 +00:00
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commit 78962123fa
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4
_includes/guide_operating_modes.md
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@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ For a client to be fooled, an adversary would need to give a complete alternativ
An alternative approach detailed in the [original Bitcoin paper][bitcoinpdf] is a client that only downloads the headers of blocks during the initial syncing process and then requests transactions from full nodes as needed. This scales linearly with the height of the block chain at only 80 bytes per block header, or up to 4.2MB per year, regardless of total block size.
As described in the white paper, the Merkle root in the block header along with a Merkle branch can prove to the SPV client that the transaction in question is embedded in a block in the block chain. This does not guarantee validity of the transactions that are embedded. Instead it demonstrates the amount of work required to perform a double-spend attack.
As described in the white paper, the merkle root in the block header along with a merkle branch can prove to the SPV client that the transaction in question is embedded in a block in the block chain. This does not guarantee validity of the transactions that are embedded. Instead it demonstrates the amount of work required to perform a double-spend attack.
The block's depth in the block chain corresponds to the cumulative difficulty that has been performed to build on top of that particular block. The SPV client knows the Merkle root and associated transaction information, and requests the respective Merkle branch from a full node. Once the Merkle branch has been retrieved, proving the existence of the transaction in the block, the SPV client can then look to block *depth* as a proxy for transaction validity and security. The cost of an attack on a user by a malicious node who inserts an invalid transaction grows with the cumulative difficulty built on top of that block, since the malicious node alone will be mining this forged chain.
The block's depth in the block chain corresponds to the cumulative difficulty that has been performed to build on top of that particular block. The SPV client knows the merkle root and associated transaction information, and requests the respective merkle branch from a full node. Once the merkle branch has been retrieved, proving the existence of the transaction in the block, the SPV client can then look to block *depth* as a proxy for transaction validity and security. The cost of an attack on a user by a malicious node who inserts an invalid transaction grows with the cumulative difficulty built on top of that block, since the malicious node alone will be mining this forged chain.
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